There is a middle road to understanding coalition politics. There is “good and bad” about coalitions. It depends, of course, on where you stand on things.

It can be good because it forces political leaders to work together towards a better future, with one group presumably keeping another in check – and thereby expands the scope of “widely accepted” laws.

It can be bad because political leaders have to make compromises when compromise may not be the best way ahead, and even “widely accepted laws” may not be better. They are simply widely accepted.

Compromise, here, refers to steering public policymaking along a middle path and seeing “both sides” and accommodating “both sides”. This is not to say there are only two sides, but let’s stick with the binary, if only because the choice before the electorate is between continuity and rupture.

One problem with the emergence of coalition politics in South Africa is that coalitions come together after elections when, it seems, the coalitions become a sharing of the spoils. It might be better if they came together before an election; that way we would know what to expect and make better decisions.

As it stands the scramble for coalitions after the polls becomes something of a harum-scarum, which very often ends in short-term gains or, as we have seen up and down the country in legislatures, politicians who are mere place-holders or puppets. A dreadful statement it may be, “but it is what it is”.

Contesting the opportunity to do more harm

More than any election since 1994, this month’s poll is properly a choice between rupture and continuity. Even just that is insufficient a statement to make. It’s not like “continuity” is ideal in this case; the evidence of the past 15 years paints a gloomy picture. Things cannot possibly continue as they have since around 2009.

One would imagine, therefore, that a rupture is necessary to force a break between the past 15 years and what dreams may come. In these senses, the main contest is over who would do the least harm to an already fractured (and fractious) society.

An immediate problem is that the most vocal political forces, those who combined can get the most support – enough to unseat the ANC – are a threat to any future order that may emerge. They and their followers may, of course, disagree. This is the putative coalition between the EFF and Jacob Zuma’s uMkhonto Wesizwe (MK) party.

It excludes right-wingers like Herman Mashaba’s ActionSA, the outright tribalists (and quite conservative) IFP, and a band of actors who promote identity or regional politics.

The DA and Rise Mzansi sit comfortably in a broad band of liberalism, classical liberalism, and, when nobody is paying attention, light touches of conservatism with hints of social democracy.

I am probably being too glib about Rise Mzansi, but they don’t seem to be more than the DA with a handshake and a smile, or the ANC after hand sanitiser, and abandoning the queue at the eat-as-much-as-you-can buffet. It’s hard to see the DA and Rise Mzansi gaining more than about 30% of the national vote at the end of the month.

The DA, in particular, is like a firecracker that’s been sinking deeper into water over the past decade or so.

In terms of numbers, the EFF-MK are likely to pose the biggest challenge to the status quo, and may find a home in the imagination of university students, KwaZulu-Natal and among Zuma loyalists and people who believe in anyone-but-Cyril. The EFF and MK share a platform which I have placed on the far right of a spectrum because of their politics of revenge, threats of violence, ethno-nationalism and the personality cult that marks their leaders.

Perhaps naïvely, I have always associated leftism with nonviolence, demilitarisation, social justice, with “peace at home, peace in the world” sincere humility, protection of common-pool resources, and (how do I avoid using a big word?) non-utilitarianism and doing good for the sake of doing good.

The EFF-MK do not represent any of that.

Given, especially, the parallels with interwar fascism (see here, here, here, or here) there is little doubt that they would be disastrous for the country.

The choice between rupture and continuity is not easy. It’s like the metaphorical threat that runs in the Straits of Messina; veer to the one side and you’re crushed, veer to the other and you’re devoured. The only certainty is that continuity is unsustainable.

A lot more can go wrong

South Africa has not hit rock bottom. Countries like Somalia or Liberia hit rock bottom when I studied their collapse in the early 1990s. Very little seems to have changed in states like Somalia, Liberia or Haiti for that matter.

South Africa is also not a failed state. The state is strong enough. The legal system is strong. The education system exists, but is in an appalling state; I still don’t understand how a first-year university student is unable to read or write a complex sentence.

The private sector is strong, but exasperated and fast approaching an end to their loyalty. My view of the capitalist system comes into play here. I think that those with money will increasingly hoard and place their wealth in black markets, strengthening the black economy and weakening societies in which they are embedded.

In India, one research project concluded that the black economy was “eating away at the innards of Indian society”. Read an introduction to Arun Kumar’s book, Understanding the Black Economy and Black Money in India. I am not as positive about “correcting or remedying” the problem.

The intelligentsia remains vibrant, but it’s shrinking, and continuing to become the centre of their own attention. I have a special interest in the role of intellectuals. At the best of times, the intelligentsia serves two important functions in society: stabilisation of the social system, and critical analysis. South African intellectuals (while I’m insufficiently intelligent, I should probably count myself among intellectuals) may be losing trust for their pretences of autonomy, while they blithely engage in rivalry among themselves and, of course, promote the single narratives upon which their livelihood depends.

Altogether, South Africa is a democratic country governed by laws, almost all of which remain in place, and with agencies and institutions in place – albeit they are constantly undermined and may not last to effectively serve the next generation of South Africans.

Pick a side and toss a coin

What happens next after the election and into the next several years is open to speculation and conjecture. It depends, of course, on our political, ideological, religious, pecuniary or other preferences.

It really is that simple; you pick a side, but you cannot tell which way the coin will fall. We should probably stick to basic or classical probability theories, but I am tempted to say that the coin may fall on its edge if it is thick or wide enough.

This, anyway, is the sense one gets from politics of the radical populists, and especially the idea that South Africa’s next finance minister might be the EFF’s Floyd Shivambu. There are at least four things to make of Julius Malema’s suggestion that Shivambu would be the pawn in the play of compromises that may come after the election. I actually don’t believe it will happen, but…

First, by presenting Shivambu as the country’s next finance minister, Malema might be flying a kite. It is presented to gauge reaction.

Second, as with most ideologues who want to attain power without accountability, question or transparency, and are exceptionally good at performative politics, Malema may be making a demand which he knows is impossible to meet. You must be a religious reader of sentimental greeting cards to “believe in the impossible”.

Third, let us assume that Shivambu is actually knowledgeable, insightful, visionary and sufficiently familiar with the political and technical workings of global finance. If this is the case, he will be successful. Except there is no evidence to suggest that Shivambu has any of the above qualities and attributes, and is a stable genius, whatever the records of Wits University’s politics department may evidence.

Read more in Daily Maverick: 2024 elections

This brings us to a fourth point, which takes us back to the top. The next election will more than likely throw up a coalition government. This government can either be chosen to ensure continuity (which most people in the private sector and in civil society prefer), or it would be a government that wants to simultaneously break with everything and everybody associated with the past three decades, and especially with the compromise that was reached in the early 1990s.

Drawing on Malema’s rhetoric of revolution, his opposition to the political settlement of the early 1990s and attendant “losses” (which I previously detailed) we may have a complete reset of South Africa’s political economy.

This would effectively take us back to democratic South Africa’s year zero, starting with massive rupture and upheaval. The choice of the electorate may then be heads (continuity) or tails (rupture) – neither outcome is comforting.

Whatever good or bad we may think of compromises, there are some that force us to develop new, better coping mechanisms if we are to hand the next generation a country in which it is worth living. DM